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Why adopt codes of good governance? A comparison of institutional 
and efficiency perspectives 
Abstract 
Given the global diffusion and the relevance of codes of good governance, the aim of 
this article is to investigate if the main reason behind their proliferation in civil law 
countries is (i) the determination to improve the efficiency of the national governance 
system, or (ii) the will to “legitimize” domestic companies in the global financial 
market without radically improving the governance practices. We collected corporate 
governance codes developed worldwide at the end of 2005 and classified them 
according to the country’s legal system (common law or civil law). Then, we made a 
comparative analysis of the scope, coverage, and strictness of recommendations of the 
codes. We tested differences between common law and civil law countries using t-tests 
and probit models. Our findings suggest that the issuance of codes in civil law countries 
is prompted more by legitimation reasons than by the determination to improve the 
governance practices of national companies. The study contributes to enriching our 
knowledge on (i) the process of reinvention characterizing the diffusion of new 
practices, and (ii) the interplay between law and codes’ recommendations in corporate 
governance practices. 
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Why adopt codes of good governance? A comparison of institutional 
and efficiency perspectives 
Introduction 
The separation between ownership and control in large companies leads to the need for 
corporate governance (Berle and Means, 1932), i.e. a set of complementary mechanisms 
built on one another and aimed at protecting investors’ rights and reducing managerial 
opportunism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance practices vary across 
institutional environments (e.g. Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Crouch and Streek, 1997; 
Gordon and Roe, 2004; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Weimer and Pape, 1999). Governance 
practices reflect, in fact, differences in culture, traditional financing options, corporate 
ownership patterns, and legal origin.  
The characteristics of governance practices within a given country are the result of 
both forces aimed at increasing their efficiency, and legitimization effects due to path 
dependence (Gordon and Roe, 2004). Concerning the efficiency forces, product and 
capital market pressures arising from globalization force the convergence of local 
governance practices towards the dominant international model (e.g. Becht et al., 2002; 
Cuervo, 2002; Davis and Steil, 2001; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2004; Mallin, 2002; 
Whitley, 1999). The integration of financial markets and the pressure from Anglo-
Saxon institutional investors shape the corporate governance of large companies in any 
country. This in turn increases the protection of shareholders’ rights, encourages the 
creation of a more independent and active board of directors, and favors the 
development of more transparent and efficient financial markets (Monks and Minow, 
2004; Van den Berghe, 2002). Furthermore, the forces of globalization create 
competition among governance systems and increase the anxiety of the political elite 
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concerning the effectiveness of the national governance model (Gordon and Roe, 2004). 
Finally, corporate scandals which occurred in many countries at the beginning of the 
new century (e.g. Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing in the US; Parmalat and Cirio in 
Italy; Ahold in the Netherlands; etc.) have forced politicians, national stock exchanges, 
financial authorities, and supranational organizations (such as EU, OECD or IMF) to 
search for more effective governance practices (e.g. Coffee, 2005; Hill, 2005). 
Despite the benefits of effective governance practices and the pressure from 
globalization forces, changing governance models is not easy because they are 
embedded in the national institutional environment (Aoki, 2001; North, 1990; Whitley, 
1999). The high complementarity among governance practices may hinder convergence 
because: i) altering one mechanism without changing the others may dissipate the 
benefits arising from their interaction; ii) it is difficult to transform many institutions at 
the same time and in a coordinated way (e.g. Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Schmidt and 
Spindler, 2002). Furthermore, modifying governance practices often requires amending 
laws and therefore agreement between the political and corporate elite on the 
governance model to adopt (Gordon and Roe, 2004). Initial governance practices have, 
in fact, distributional effects and create interest groups supporting the status quo. The 
domestic elite may resist external pressure to adopt more effective governance practices 
if they undermine the private benefits of control of this group (e.g. Bebchuk and Roe, 
1999; Rhodes and van Apeldoom, 1998). 
That being said, this article focuses on the diffusion of new governance practices 
with the aim of extending the existing empirical evidence (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Cuervo Cazurra and Aguilera, 2004) on the reasons behind the adoption 
of codes of good governance. Codes of good governance are a set of best practices 
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recommendations regarding boards issued to address deficiencies in a country’s 
governance systems. These deficiencies are strictly related to the legal tradition of a 
country (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, and 1999), and existing evidence shows that 
common law countries grant better protection to investors’ rights than civil law 
countries (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2006). 
The adoption of new practices within a social system may be explained referring 
to two main theoretical sources: efficiency (or rational) accounts and social legitimation 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Strang and Macy 2001; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). The 
former points to the efficiency gains following innovation or the adoption of a practice. 
The latter suggests that practices are adopted because of their growing taken-for-
grantedness which makes adoption socially expected. Following these two rationales, if 
efficiency reasons prevail, civil law countries will develop codes before common law 
countries and their codes will have stricter recommendations. If legitimation reasons 
prevail, civil law countries will develop codes later than common law countries and 
their codes will have weaker recommendations. 
To investigate reasons behind codes’ adoption, we collected data on the diffusion 
of codes of good governance until 2005. We also collected the good governance codes 
developed worldwide at the end of 2005 and classified them according to the legal 
tradition of their country (common law or civil law). For each code we analyzed the 
scope (i.e. listed or also non-listed companies), the coverage (i.e. the number of issues 
addressed), and the strictness (i.e. the presence of clear and stringent recommendations 
versus vague and elastic ones). We employed difference-of-means and probit models to 
compare codes in common law and civil law systems.  
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Both legitimation and efficiency reasons seem to explain the diffusion of good 
governance codes. On the efficiency side, civil law countries extend code 
recommendations to non-listed companies more often than common law countries do. 
On the legitimation side, civil law countries adopt codes later, issue a lower number of 
codes, and state more ambiguous and lenient recommendations. Taken together, our 
findings suggest that the issuance of codes in civil law countries is prompted more by 
legitimation reasons than by the determination to dramatically improve the governance 
practices of national companies. 
This article contributes to both management and legal literature. In particular, it 
provides further knowledge on (i) the process of reinvention that usually characterizes 
the diffusion of new practices, and (ii) the interplay between hard and soft law in 
governance practices. 
 
Theoretical development 
The diffusion of new practices 
The decision to issue a code of good governance can be assimilated to the adoption of 
new practices in an existing corporate governance system (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004). Codes of good governance are, in fact, best practice recommendations 
regarding the characteristics of the board of directors and other governance 
mechanisms. They provide a voluntary means for innovation and improvement of 
governance practices. 
A diffused practice can be defined as an innovation within a social system, 
although the innovation does not necessarily entail an “improvement”, but rather a 
change in the current state (Strang and Macy, 2001). Many scholars explain the 
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adoption of new practices and their homogeneity within a social system by referring to 
two main theoretical approaches: efficiency theory and institutional theory (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Strang and Soule, 1998; Strang and Macy, 2001; Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983; Westphal et al., 1997). Reasons of efficiency and legitimation both compete with 
and complement each other (Scott, 2001). The two approaches are not necessarily 
incompatible because organizations may adopt practices for different reasons (Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1983). There is evidence suggesting that both efficiency and legitimation 
reasons may lead to the adoption of new practices (e.g. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). 
The first theoretical approach views organizations as rational actors, albeit in a 
complex environment, and points to the gains in efficiency or effectiveness that may 
follow innovation or the adoption of a practice (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Thompson, 
1967). Some examples of adoption motivated by technical or rational needs are the 
adoption of the multidivisional form (Chandler, 1962), the creation of professional 
programs by failing liberal arts schools (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996), or the introduction of 
conventions into the broadcasting field (Leblebici et al., 1991).  
Conversely, the second theoretical approach views organizations as captives of 
the institutional environment in which they exist and suggests that practices are adopted 
because of their growing taken-for-grantedness improving qualities which make 
adoption socially expected (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1983). Tolbert and 
Zucker (1983) in their study on civil service reform in US municipalities illustrated that 
early adopters were driven to change by technical-competitive reasons and late adopters 
were driven to conform to what had become best practice. They argued that the early 
adopters of civil service reforms provided the legitimacy for innovation and other 
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organizations were then under pressure to adopt the reforms for fear of losing 
legitimacy. Tolbert and Zucker (1983: 25) defined institutionalization as “the process 
through which components of formal structure become widely accepted, as both 
appropriate and necessary, and serve to legitimate organizations.” If practices become 
institutionalized, their adoption brings legitimation to the adopting organizations or 
social systems even if sometimes these practices fulfill symbolic rather than task-related 
requirements. 
The process of homogenization is called isomorphism and defined as a 
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions (Hawley, 1968). There are two types of 
isomorphism: competitive and institutional (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Competitive 
isomorphism assumes a system rationality that emphasizes market competition, niche 
change and fitness measures. A common view is that this type of isomorphism is 
relevant for fields in which free and open competition exists and may apply to early 
adoption of innovation. However, this does not present an entirely adequate picture of 
the modern world of organizations. To do so, it must be supplemented by an 
institutional view of isomorphism, according to which organizations compete not just 
for resources and customers but for political power and institutional legitimacy, and for 
social as well as economic fitness (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
The large majority of contributions on the diffusion of new practices focused on 
the mechanisms facilitating or inhibiting the transmission process. These studies imply 
a binary approach of adoption/non-adoption for the most part, and treat the practices 
themselves as relatively unchanging and uniform. However, innovation diffusion is a 
dynamic process and diffusing practices may be modified or “reinvented” by adopters 
 8
(e.g. Rogers, 1995; Tornatzky et al. 1983). Reinvention is likely to be the rule, not the 
exception and researchers call for further study on the factors explaining changes in 
practice content (e.g. Campbell, 2005; Cool et al., 1997).  
Finally, institutional theorists highlight that organizations may resist conforming 
to external pressures due to inertial effects and firm history (e.g. Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983). North (1990) affirms that institutions are shaped by historical factors limiting the 
range of options available to decision makers. Matthews (1986) argues that inertia plays 
an important role in institutional persistence. Old institutionalists (e.g. Selznick, 1949) 
highlight the role of politics in shaping formal structures, and focus their analysis on 
group conflict due to diverging interests. New institutionalists devote less attention on 
‘how incumbents maintain their dominant positions’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 30). 
However, DiMaggio and Powell acknowledge that ‘actors in key institutions realize 
considerable gains from the maintenance of those institutions’ (1991: 30) and that ‘the 
acquisition and maintenance of power within organizational fields requires that 
dominant organizations continually enact strategies of control’ (1991: 30-31). 
 
The good governance codes 
Codes of good governance can be considered a set of best practices regarding the board 
of directors and other governance mechanisms. Such codes have been designed to 
address deficiencies in the corporate governance system by recommending a set of 
norms aimed at improving transparency and accountability among top managers and 
directors (Fernandez-Rodriguez et al., 2004). 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) found that codes of good governance were 
issued mainly by the stock market or by managers’ associations. Directors’ associations, 
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investors’ associations, and the government did not play a large role in developing 
national governance practices. This evidence runs counter to the popular claim that 
institutional investors are the primary triggers of good governance, though these 
investors may have pressured stock-exchange commissions and private associations to 
improve governance practices at country level.  
In most legal systems, codes of good governance have no specific legal basis and 
are not legally binding (Wymeersch, 2006). Enforcement is generally left to the 
effectiveness of internal corporate bodies (i.e. the board of directors) and of external 
market forces. Only in a few countries (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands in Europe) 
the law attaches explicit legal consequences to the code or even to its provisions 
(Wymeersch, 2005).  
Even if compliance with code recommendations is traditionally voluntary and 
based on the “comply or explain” rule, empirical evidence shows that publicly traded 
companies tend to respond to the main code recommendations (e.g. Conyon and Mallin, 
1997; Gregory and Simmelkjaer, 2002). Furthermore, a previous study (Fernandez-
Rodriguez et al., 2004) suggests that the market reacts positively to announcements of 
compliance with the code. In brief, codes of best practices exert major influence on the 
corporate governance of listed companies, at least formally (Werder et al., 2005).  
The content of codes has been strongly influenced by corporate governance 
studies and practices. Codes touch fundamental governance issues such as fairness to all 
shareholders, clear accountability by directors and managers, transparency in financial 
and non-financial reporting, the composition and structure of boards, and the 
responsibility for stakeholders’ interests and for complying with the law (Coombes and 
Chiu-Yin Wong, 2004; Gregory and Simmelkjaer, 2002).  
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The core of codes of good governance lies in the recommendations on the board 
of directors. Following the dominant agency theory (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), governance codes encourage the 
board of directors to play an active and independent role in controlling the behavior of 
top management. In particular, scholars and practitioners (e.g. Charan, 1998; Conger et 
al., 1998; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) recommend the quest 
for an increasing number of non-executive and independent directors, the splitting of 
Chairman and CEO roles, the creation of board committees (nomination, remuneration, 
and the audit committee) made up of non-executive independent directors, and the 
development of an evaluation procedure for the board. The introduction of these 
practices is considered a necessary factor in order to avoid governance problems and to 
increase board and firm performance.  
 
The reasons behind the diffusion of good governance codes 
An open question, which has still not been extensively studied, is whether codes of 
good governance have been adopted to pursue efficiency or for institutional (i.e 
legitimation) reasons (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). 
The efficiency rationale. The main function of codes of good governance is to 
compensate for deficiencies in the legal system regarding investor protection. In 
countries with weak protection of investors’ rights, the potential benefits for the 
economic system associated with the reinforcement of good governance practices are 
greater than in countries with strong protection of investors’ rights. Increasing the 
efficiency of governance practices can, in fact, encourage global institutional investors 
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to invest more money in domestic companies (e.g. Brancato, 1997; Gordon and Roe, 
2004).  
Previous studies (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1998 and 1999) showed 
that deficiencies in the corporate governance systems are linked to the legal tradition of 
a country, and that common law countries provide stronger investor protection than civil 
law countries. The anti-director rights index and the distinction between common law 
and civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1997 and 1998) have been routinely used as 
measures of legal shareholder protection in cross-country quantitative studies.  
The “law matters” approach and its original anti-director index have been 
criticized for mistakes in coding, conceptual ambiguity in the definitions of some 
components, and the over-generalization of findings (e.g. Pagano and Volpin, 2005; 
Roe, 2006; Spamann, 2005). Prompted by the critics, Djankov et al. (2006) constructed 
a more robust index, measuring the strength of minority shareholder protection against 
self-dealing by the controlling shareholder. After a robust revision of the methodology 
used to measure investor protection around the world, Djankov et al. (2006) conclude 
that strong and significant differences exist between common law and civil law 
countries in terms of investor protection and several financial measures (i.e. valuable 
stock markets, more initial public offerings, and lower benefits of control). 
Summing up, in countries with weak investor protection, the size of private 
benefits, measured as the observed size of the voting premium, is higher than in other 
countries (Zingales, 1994). Due to the absence of strong shareholders’ rights, top 
managers and controlling shareholders can use a large variety of mechanisms to extract 
value from the company at the expense of minority shareholders (Morck and Yeung, 
2003). In these conditions, the adoption of codes of good governance with a large 
 12
coverage and strict recommendations may dramatically increase firm efficiency and 
reduce the cost of capital (Brancato, 1997). In summary, if efficiency reasons prevail, 
we would expect the following relationships to hold: 
Hypothesis 1a: civil law countries will issue codes before common law countries. 
Hypothesis 2a: civil law countries will be more prone to develop codes than common 
law countries. 
Hypothesis 3a: codes developed by civil law countries will have a larger scope than 
codes developed by common law countries. 
Hypothesis 4a: codes developed by civil law countries will have a larger coverage than 
codes developed by common law countries. 
Hypothesis 5a: codes developed by civil law countries will have more stringent 
recommendations than codes developed by common law countries. 
 
The institutional (legitimation) rationale. The development of codes of good 
governance aims to increase not only the efficiency of governance rules, but also the 
legitimation of national companies in the global financial market. Competition among 
countries in the global economy generates coercive or normative imitation, i.e. mimetic 
isomorphism (Guler et al., 2002). Countries more exposed to other national economic 
systems experience greater pressure to harmonize and legitimate their governance 
practices. A previous study (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004) supports this idea, 
showing that codes of good governance are more likely to be issued in countries where 
there are high government liberalization and a strong presence of foreign institutional 
investors. 
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Under the pressure of external forces, the national stock exchanges, the domestic 
associations and the governments may be forced to change governance practices in the 
country not only to increase the efficiency of domestic companies, but also to 
harmonize the national corporate governance system with international best practices. 
Avoiding adherence to governance principles developed at an international level means, 
in fact, running the risk of not attracting global investors and increasing the weighted 
average cost of capital for national companies (e.g. Brancato, 1997; Davis and Steil, 
2001). 
The effects of the institutional forces producing isomorphic behaviour among 
firms located in different countries are not irresistible. A recent study provides findings 
that “run against the conventional wisdom that globalization is an inexorable, uniform, 
and homogeneous process tending toward unmitigated isomorphism across countries, at 
least in the adoption of organizational practices” (Guler et al., 2002: 227). Furthemore, 
it shows that “discernible cross-national patterns in rates of diffusion exist, and they 
shed light on the forces driving the process” (Guler et al., 2002: 227).  
Two sorts of path dependence may slow down the change in governance practices 
(Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). First, governance practices are mutually complementary 
mechanisms, so modifying one of them – without changing the others – may eliminate 
the benefits arising from their interaction (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Schmidt and 
Spindler, 2002). Second, the corporate elite may resist the introduction of better 
governance practices, because such a change may reduce their power to extract private 
benefits of control from the firm’s assets (e.g. Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Collier and 
Zaman, 2005; Morck and Yeung, 2003; Rhodes and van Apeldoom, 1998; Zattoni, 
1999). 
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Summing up, in countries with weak protection of investors’ rights there would be 
a strong urgency to issue codes of good governance and to adopt strict governance 
practices to increase transparency and efficiency of the financial markets. However, two 
sorts of rule-driven path dependence (based on efficiency and rent-seeking) may oppose 
the introduction of such codes because of complementarities among governance 
practices and the will to extract private benefits of control from company’s assets 
(Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). These forces cannot avoid the introduction of good 
governance codes, but they can slow down their development and limit the changes in 
national governance systems. In summary, if legitimation reasons prevail we would 
expect the following relationships to hold: 
Hypothesis 1b: civil law countries will issue codes later than common law countries. 
Hypothesis 2b: civil law countries will be less prone to develop codes than common law 
countries. 
Hypothesis 3b: codes developed by civil law countries will have a narrower or the same 
scope than codes developed by common law countries. 
Hypothesis 4b: codes developed by civil law countries will have a narrower or the same 
coverage than codes developed by common law countries. 
Hypothesis 5b: codes developed by civil law countries will have less stringent 
recommendations than codes developed by common law countries. 
 
Research design 
Sample 
Our sample includes 60 countries: the 49 countries contained in the data set of La Porta 
et al. (1998) and all EU member States at the end of 2005. By that time, 44 out of the 60 
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countries issued at least one code of good governance. Table 1 summarizes the most 
recent worldwide codes categorized by country legal system, year and issuer. 
To classify codes according to their legal system, we relied on previous studies 
that identified two principal secular legal traditions: civil law and common law (La 
Porta et al., 1998; Reynolds and Flores, 1989). Our sample contains 29 civil law 
countries (13 with French, 12 with German, and 4 with Scandinavian civil law) and 15 
common law countries. We assigned a dummy variable to each code for the legal 
systems: 0 for civil law, and 1 for common law. 
 
(Insert here Table 1) 
 
Data collection 
We collected archival data on the diffusion and the content of codes. In particular, for 
each country, we collected data about (i) the year of issuance of the first code and the 
number of codes issued until 2005, and (ii) the scope, the coverage, and the strictness of 
recommendations of each most recent code (at the end of 2005).  
Concerning the diffusion of codes, for each country we recorded the year of 
issuance of the first code and the number of codes issued until 2005. We then calculated 
the distance between the year of issuance of the first code in the sample (1992) and the 
year of issuance of the first code in each country to measure the delay in code adoption. 
Concerning the content of codes, we built a comprehensive database of the most 
recent codes of good governance developed worldwide at the end of 2005. Our main 
sources of information are the “Comparative study of corporate governance codes 
relevant to the European Union and its member states” (Gregory and Simmelkjaer, 
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2002), the “Survey of corporate governance developments in OECD countries” (OECD, 
2003), and the “Code and principles” section on the European Corporate Governance 
Institute web site (www.ecgi.org). For reasons of consistency, our database includes 
only codes of good corporate governance. We excluded laws and legal regulations, 
reports on compliance with codes already issued, codes on the behavior of top 
management, consulting firm reports, and individual or specific company codes. 
Our study focuses on analyzing the content of the most recent codes instead of 
first codes for the following reasons. First, the diffusion of codes across countries did 
not follow a linear path (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Though some countries 
issued their first code at the beginning of the ‘90s, codes of good governance became 
widely diffused only at the end of the ‘90s and the beginning of the new millennium. 
Second, in the last decades the debate on good governance has dramatically evolved and 
the “ideal” or “recommended” model today is very different from the one designed in 
the early ‘90s (Tricker, 2000). Third, recent corporate scandals have created a 
discontinuity in the history of corporate governance and many countries dramatically 
changed corporate law to strengthen shareholders’ and investors’ rights (Gordon and 
Roe, 2004).  
For each code we collected data on scope, coverage and strictness of 
recommendations. We use the term “scope” to mean the types of companies considered 
by the code. Codes of good governance primarily describe practices for publicly traded 
companies, but some codes extend their principles to non-listed companies as well. We 
created a dummy variable to measure the scope of each code: 0 only listed companies, 1 
otherwise. 
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We use the term “coverage” to mean the number of principles of good governance 
covered by each code. Codes have similar contents, but they may also differ in some 
principles. So we analyzed codes to see if they cover the following items (Gregory and 
Simmelkjaer, 2002): shareholders’ rights, employees’ role, board meeting and agenda, 
separation of Chairman and CEO, board composition and independence, board 
directorship, deontology for directors, conflict of interest, election term/term 
limits/mandatory retirement, evaluating board performance, directors’ remuneration, 
remuneration committee, nomination committee and audit committee (see Table 2). We 
created a dummy variable for each principle: 0 not covered, 1 covered. 
 
(Insert here Table 2)  
 
Finally, we collected detailed notes on the codes’ recommendations regarding the 
board of directors (i.e. the separation of Chairman and CEO, the board composition and 
independence, evaluating board performance, the composition of remuneration, 
nomination, and audit committees). These principles can be considered the core of good 
governance codes. The strictness of recommendations may vary from objective and 
strict on the one hand, and vague and loose on the other hand. Subsequent readings of 
the collected data focused on identifying the differences among codes. After comparing 
and contrasting data numerous times (Maxwell, 1996), we classified recommendations 
as (i) “strong” when they contained objectively strong and quantitatively rigid rules, (ii) 
“semi-strong” when they contained objectively semi-strong and quantitatively rigid 
rules, (iii) “weak” when they didn’t contain objective and quantitatively rigid rules, but 
only vague and general ones, and (iv) “not covered” when the topic wasn’t covered by 
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the code (see Table 3 for the final categorization). We assigned a number to each 
recommendation: 3 for strong recommendations, 2 for semi-strong, 1 for weak, and 0 
for not covered. We also measured the strictness of all codes’ recommendations on the 
board of directors using a variable (i.e. the overall strength of the code) calculated as the 
number of strong recommendations on boards included in each code.  
 
(Insert here Table 3) 
 
Data analysis 
Data analysis of the content of codes followed generic prescriptions for analyzing 
qualitative data and involved various applications of sorting, organizing and coding data 
(Lee, 1999). This was done through the use of theoretical memos (Maxwell, 1996). 
We started collecting information on the governance systems of countries 
considered in the study to understand the main peculiarities of national corporate 
governance systems. We collected information from different sources, such as books 
and articles presenting or comparing national governance systems (e.g. Charkham, 
1994; Gugler, 2001; Hopt et al., 1998; Reynolds and Flores, 1989; etc.). We also 
analyzed literature on codes (e.g. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Gregory and 
Simmelkjaer, 2002; etc.) to set up an initial coding scheme.  
Then we started coding two codes from each country-origin legal system: the UK 
and the US code for English origin legal systems, the Norwegian and the Swedish code 
for Scandinavian origin legal system, the German and the Japanese code for German 
origin, and the French and the Italian code for France origin. Both scholars rated 
independently all items. After this test of the coding system, we measured consistency 
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among coders and we defined coding rules according to the differences encountered. 
Then the entire coding process has been repeated for all codes of good governance.  
Each code was independently analyzed in detail by the researchers and was 
interpreted on a continual and evolving basis in order to decompose and reduce data 
(Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). Following the prescription for qualitative research, we 
analyzed collected data quantitatively using nominal and categorical variables (Marshall 
and Rossman, 1995). At the end of the independent analysis, we matched the two sets of 
data and we found a high overlap: only 14 out of 264 measures of the strictness of 
codes’ recommendations were differently coded by researchers. We measured inter-
rater reliability using both percent agreement and Cohen’s Kappa (e.g. Cohen, 1968; 
Dewey, 1983). The results of the analysis of inter-rater reliability are high, and above 
appropriate minimum acceptable level of reliability. The percent agreement equals to 
.946 and the Cohen’s kappa to .929. 
Then, we identified the few cases that were the subject of disagreement and we 
analyzed them to find a solution. We organized a few meetings to discuss disagreed-on 
cases. Disagreements were mostly caused by misinterpretation of the meaning of codes’ 
recommendations due to differences among national systems of governance. To 
reconcile disagreements we analyzed in detail the information collected on the national 
governance systems. Then we read again the code of good governance, and we 
discussed non-matched cases. The deeper knowledge of countries’ governance practices 
allowed us to reach an agreement without a long discussion.  
To compare codes’ diffusion, scope, and coverage between common law and civil 
law legal systems we used t-test for difference-of-means. To examine the 
recommendations at a board level, we used probit models with the strictness of the 
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recommendations as a dependent variable, and the country of origin legal system as an 
independent variable. We also controlled for two country level variables: the log of 
GDP (2005), measuring the size of the economic system, and the market capitalization 
as a percentage of the GDP (2005), measuring the relevance of the stock exchange in 
the national economy. Both country variables were collected from the World Bank’s 
database of World Development Indicators.  
 
Results 
The diffusion of codes 
The first code included in our sample is the Cadbury code, issued in the UK in 1992. 
After that time, the diffusion of codes started slowly – until 1998, only 13 countries had 
issued a code – but accelerated at the end of the decade – 23 countries issued their first 
code after 2000. Moreover, 95 out of 144 codes developed around the world until 2005 
were issued between 2000 and 2005 (see figure 1).  
 
(Insert here Figure 1) 
 
We tested differences between common law and civil law countries in the year of 
issue of the first code and in the number of codes issued until 2005 using a t-test (see 
Table 4). Our results show that civil law countries issued codes of good governance 
later than common law countries. The average distance in years from 1992 is 
significantly different in the two groups (p < .05): 6.4 years for common law countries 
versus 8.2 years for civil law countries. Moreover, common law countries are more 
prone to issue codes than civil law countries. The number of codes issued is 
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significantly different in the two groups (p < .05): 5.9 codes for common law countries 
versus 2.9 codes for civil law countries. Our results support hypothesis 1b and 2b. 
 
(Insert here Table 4) 
 
The scope of codes 
The majority of codes contain recommendations for companies listed on the national 
stock exchange. However, 20 codes (out of 44) extend their recommendations to include 
non-listed companies. 
We tested differences between common law and civil law countries in the scope 
of codes using a t-test (see Table 4). Our results show that codes of good governance 
extend their recommendations to non-listed companies more often in civil law than in 
common law countries. The mean between the two groups is significantly different (p < 
.05): 0.27 for common law countries compared to 0.55 for civil law countries. Our 
results support hypothesis 3a. 
 
The coverage of codes 
All codes of good governance contain principles on “board composition and 
independence” and a large number of codes cover almost all other items; the only 
exceptions are “employees’ role”, “conflict of interest”, “deontology for directors”, and 
“board directorships”.  
We tested differences between common law and civil law countries in the 
coverage of codes using a t-test (see Table 5). Our findings show that the mean of the 
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total number of items covered by common law and civil law codes is not significantly 
different. Our results support hypothesis 4b.  
However, we found significant differences in terms of coverage of single items. 
Codes covers principles on “separation of Chairman and CEO”, “board directorship”, 
and “evaluating board performance” more often in common law than in civil law 
countries. The mean between the two groups is significantly different: “separation of 
Chairman and CEO” (0.93 versus 0.52; p < .01), “board directorship” (0.47 versus 0.24; 
p < .10), “evaluating board performance” (0.67 versus 0.38; p < .05).  
Furthermore, our results show that codes of good governance cover principles on 
“shareholder’s rights”, “employees’ role”, and “conflict of interest” more often in civil 
law than in common law countries. The mean between the two groups is significantly 
different: “shareholders’ rights” (0.86 versus 0.53; p < .01), “employees’ role” (0.21 
versus 0; p < .05), and “conflict of interest” (0.59 versus 0.27; p < .05).  
There are not significant differences between codes issued in common law and in 
civil law countries concerning any other item (i.e. “board meeting and agenda”, “board 
composition and independence”, “deontology for directors”, “election term/term 
limits/mandatory retirement”, “directors’ remuneration”, and “board committees”).  
 
(Insert here Table 5) 
 
The strictness of code recommendations 
We have seen that principles related to board of directors (i.e. “separation of Chairman 
and CEO”, “board composition and independence”, “evaluating board performance”, 
and all committees) are the core of corporate governance and are traditionally covered 
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by all codes. So, lastly we investigated if the strictness of these recommendations differs 
between common law and civil law countries.  
Table 6 shows the results of the analysis of the influence of common law systems, 
market capitalization as percentage of GDP, and log of GDP on the likelihood of the 
strictness of code recommendations on boards in a given country. The probit models 
reveal that codes in common law countries are significantly more likely than codes in 
civil law countries to issue stricter recommendations on the “separation between 
Chairman and CEO” (p < .01) and the “audit committee” (p < .05). Furthermore, the 
results show that codes in common law countries are significantly more likely to issue 
stricter recommendations on boards of directors than their civil law counterparts (p < 
.01). Our results support hypothesis 5b. 
 
(Insert here Table 6) 
 
Discussion 
This study focuses on the diffusion and content of codes of good governance to extend 
the existing empirical evidence on the topic (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Enrione et al., 2006; Hermes et al., 2006). The article contributes to management and 
legal studies on codes of good governance providing further knowledge on i) the 
process of reinvention characterizing the diffusion of new practices; ii) the interplay 
between hard and soft law in governance practices. 
The process of reinvention in the diffusion of governance codes. Our results 
support the view that diffusing practices are usually modified or “reinvented” by 
adopters (e.g. Rogers, 1995; Tornatzky et al., 1983). Our findings show, in fact, that 
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there are significant differences between common law and civil law countries as regards 
the diffusion, scope, coverage and strictness of recommendations of codes.  
Both legitimation and efficiency reasons seem to explain the adoption of good 
governance codes. On the efficiency side, civil law countries extend code 
recommendations to non-listed companies more often than common law countries do. 
On the legitimation side, civil law countries adopt codes later, issue a lower number of 
codes, and state more ambiguous and lenient recommendations1. Taken together our 
results suggest that the issuance of codes in civil law countries is prompted more by 
legitimation reasons than by the determination to dramatically improve the governance 
practices of national companies. 
Our findings also support the idea that early adopters are driven to change by 
efficiency reasons, while late adopters are driven to conform to widely-accepted 
practices (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). The common law countries as early adopters of 
codes of good governance provided the legitimacy for innovation; civil law countries as 
late adopters were then under pressure to implement the reforms for fear of losing 
legitimacy. In other words, as codes of good governance become institutionalized, their 
adoption brings legitimation to the adopting countries.  
Finally, our findings are consistent with a symbolic perspective on corporate 
governance (e.g. Westphal and Zajac, 1998). According to this view symbolic actions 
(i.e. the introduction of new governance practices) can engender significant positive 
stockholder reactions and deter other more substantive governance reforms. In 
coherence with a symbolic perspective, our evidence suggest that civil law countries 
adopt codes of good governance later and issue codes with more lenient 
recommendations than common law countries do.  
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The interplay between hard and soft law in governance practices. Our results 
show that codes of good governance issued by common law and civil law countries 
cover a slightly different range of principles. In particular, codes issued by common law 
countries more often contain recommendations related to board of directors (e.g. 
“separation between Chairman and CEO”, “board directorship”, and “evaluating board 
performance”), while codes issued by civil law countries more often cover principles 
related to “shareholders’ rights”, “employees’ role”, and “conflict of interest”.  
These differences may be explained considering the peculiarities of both 
governance systems and corporate law. The principle on “employees’ role” is, in fact, 
covered by codes developed in countries (such as Austria, Germany, Norway, and 
Sweden) where corporate codes of domestic companies grant employees the right to 
elect members to the board. On the other hand, the principle on “conflict of interest” is 
covered more often in countries (such as Austria, Germany, and France) where the 
ownership structure of domestic companies includes some industrial companies or 
financial institutions which are both company shareholders and trading partners. 
Summing up, our results support the idea that the characteristics of the national 
corporate governance system and law explain the main differences among the coverage 
of codes (e.g. Gregory and Simmelkjaer, 2002). This conclusion supports the existence 
of a strong interplay between hard and soft law, which is manifest in two respects: i) 
judges use the principles of codes as yardsticks to measure the specific conduct of 
directors; and ii) often jurisdictions take the content of soft law (e.g. code 
recommendations) and include it in corporate law (Wymeersch, 2005 and 2006).  
Before concluding, we acknowledge that our study has some limitations. First, we 
classify countries according to their legal origin. The origin of a country’s legal system 
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is considered a powerful antecedent of investors’ rights (La Porta et al., 1998), 
ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1999), and the size and breadth of capital markets 
(La Porta et al., 1997). This variable has been used as a proxy of investors’ protection in 
many comparative studies (e.g. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Despite this fact, 
it has also received some criticism (e.g. Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Roe, 2006; Spamann, 
2005). Given the persistence of differences among national governance systems (due to 
differences in culture, traditional financing options, corporate ownership patterns), 
future studies should develop a clearer picture of the interplay between hard and soft 
law at a country level.  
Second, we collected and analyzed only the most recent codes in each country. 
This means that we did not consider the dynamics of governance recommendations over 
time (e.g. Collier and Zaman, 2005), but focused instead on the governance practices at 
the end of 2005. This choice may have a bias towards efficiency in those (typically 
common law) countries with the longest tradition of codes. Future studies should be 
aimed at extending our conclusions through the analysis of the political process leading 
to the development of codes, in order to understand the interplay of the forces favoring 
and contrasting the introduction of codes and stringent code recommendations.  
Third, our study did not investigate the process of code enforcement. This may be 
a limitation, because of the existing differences between common law and civil law 
legal systems. While the intrinsic characteristics of the former facilitate the enforcement 
of codes of good governance, in the latter the development of good governance codes 
does not automatically provide additional mechanisms to protect investors’ rights 
(Cuervo, 2002). The enforcement of governance codes is a complex matter 
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(Wymeersch, 2005 and 2006) and future studies should be aimed at analyzing the effect 
of different code enforcement mechanisms on governance practices at a country level.  
 
Conclusion 
Our research investigated the reasons behind the adoption of codes of good governance 
in civil law countries. Evidence from our study show that both efficiency and 
legitimation reasons explain the codes’ diffusion. On the efficiency side, civil law 
countries extend code recommendations to non-listed companies more often than 
common law countries do. On the legitimation side, civil law countries adopt codes 
later, issue a lower number of codes, and state more ambiguous and lenient 
recommendations. In this sense, our results support the idea that the issuance of codes in 
civil law countries is prompted more by legitimation reasons than by the determination 
to improve the governance practices. These findings expand traditional understandings 
of the diffusion of governance practices and provide further support to the idea that 
symbolic actions can deter other more substantive governance reforms. Finally, our 
results support the idea that the characteristics of both the national governance system 
and the corporate law explain the main differences among issues covered by the codes.  
 
Notes 
1. It might be argued that vagueness and generality of civil law codes are needed for the very reason that 
they cover a broad corporate spectrum, including both listed and non-listed companies. However, we do 
not consider this to be the case because: i) the “comply or explain” tradition of codes of good governance 
does not force companies to adhere to codes’ recommendations; ii) a detailed analysis of codes content 
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showed that almost all codes of good governance do not discriminate their recommendations for different 
types of companies.  
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Figure 1. The diffusion of codes of good governance (1992-2005) 
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Table 1. Country origin legal system, year and issuer of most recent worldwide codes 
 
Country origin legal system Year of last code Issuer of last code Last code 
English    
Cyprus 2002 The Cyprus Stock Exchange  Corporate governance code 
Ireland 1999 Irish Association of Investment Managers Corporate Governance, Share Option and Other Incentive Schemes 
Australia 2003 ASX Corporate governance council Principles of good corporate governance and best practice recommendations 
Canada 2002 Toronto Stock Exchange Corporate governance policy-proposed new disclosure requirement and amended guidelines 
Hong Kong 2004 Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Hong Kong code of corporate governance 
India 2000 Securities and exchange board of India Report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on corporate governance 
Kenya 2002 Private sector of corporate governance trust Principles of corporate governance 
Malaysia 2000 Securities commission Malaysia Malaysian Code on corporate governance 
Pakistan 2002 The securities and exchange commission Code of corporate governance (revised) 
Singapore 2005 Council on corporate disclosure and governance Code of corporate governance 
South Africa 2002 Institute  of directors in Southern Africa King report on corporate governance for South Africa 2002 (King II Report) 
New Zealand 2004 Securities  Commission Corporate governance in New Zealand: principles and guidelines 
Thailand 2002 Stock Exchange of Thailand Code of best practice for directors of listed companies 
USA 2003 New York Stock Exchange Final NYSE Corporate governance rules 
UK 2003 The Financial Reporting Council The combined code on corporate governance 
French    
Belgium 2004 Corporate governance committee Belgian corporate governance code 
France 2003 Association Française des Entreprises Privées The corporate governance of listed corporations 
Greece 2001 Federation of Greek Industries Principles of good governance 
Brazil 2004 Instituto Brasileiro de governanca corporativa Code of best practice of corporate governance 
Indonesia 2001 The national committee on corporate governance Code for good corporate governance 
Mexico 1999 Mexican Stock Exchange Codigo de mejores practicas corporativas 
Perù 2002 National Supervisory commission of companies and securities Principios de buen gobierno para las sociedades 
Italy 2002 Committee for the corporate governance Corporate governance code 
Malta 2005 Malta Financial Services Authority Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
Portugal 2003 Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários  Recommendations on Corporate Governance 
Spain 2004 Instituto de Consejeros-Administradores Principles of good corporate governance 
Turkey 2003 Capital markets board of Turkey Corporate governance principles 
The Netherlands 2003 Corporate Governance Committee The Dutch corporate governance code 
German     
Austria 2002 Austrian Working Group for Corporate Governance Austrian code of corporate governance 
Czech Republic 2004 Czech Securities Commission Corporate governance code 
Germany 2003 Government Commission German Corporate Governance Code The Cromme Code 
Korea 1999 Committee on corporate governance Code of best practice for corporate governance 
Japan 2004 Tokyo Stock Exchange Principles of corporate governance for listed companies 
Taiwan 2002 Taiwan Stock Exchange Taiwan corporate governance best-practice principles 
Switzerland 2002 Swiss business federation Swiss code of best practice for corporate governance 
Hungary 2002 Budapest Stock Exchange Corporate governance recommendations 
Lithuania 2003 Lithuania stock exchange The corporate governance code 
Poland 2004 The Best Practices Committee of the Warsaw Stock Exchange in association with the 
Corporate Governance Forum 
Best practices in public companies 
Slovakia 2002 Bratislava Stock Exchange Corporate governance code 
Slovenia 2005 Ljubljana Stock Exchange, Managers' Association of Slovenia, Association of the 
Supervisory Board Members of Slovenia 
Corporate governance code 
Scandinavian    
Denmark 2003 Copenhagen Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance Report on Corporate governance in Denmark 
Finland 2003 HEX Plc, Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland  Confederation of Finnish Industry 
and Employers 
Corporate governance recommendation for listed companies 
Sweden 2004 The codes group Swedish code of corporate governance. Report of the code group 
Norway 2005 Norwegian Corporate governance Board The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance 
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Table 2. Items considered in the analysis of codes’ coverage 
 
Items Description 
Shareholders’ rights Treatment of shareholders in term of one share/one vote, protection from 
controlling shareholders’ abuse, general meeting participation and proxy voting 
Employees’ role Role of employees in corporate governance in term of right to elect some 
members of the board 
Board meeting and 
agenda  
Frequency of board meetings per year and agenda 
 
Separation of 
Chairman and CEO 
Separation between the role of chairman and chief executive officer 
 
Board composition 
and independence  
Board recommendations in term of minimum size, composition, mix of inside 
and outside directors, qualification, and membership criteria such as 
experience, personal characteristics, independence, core competencies and 
availability 
Board directorship Directorship recommendations in term of number and kind of positions that 
each director should have in other companies 
Deontology for 
directors Specific director’s criteria 
Conflict of interest Non competition obligations and specific principles to avoid conflict of interest 
for board’s members 
Election term/term 
limits/ 
mandatory retirement 
Specific election term criteria such as age, appoint term and re-election term 
 
Evaluating board 
performance 
Boards evaluation procedures 
 
Directors’ 
remuneration 
A specific set of remuneration principles for directors both executive and non-
executive and managers in term of shares, share-price incentives, share option 
schemes and limit to vest shares and to exercise options 
Remuneration 
committee  
A specific set of criteria about roles, size, composition, membership criteria 
such as experience, personal characteristics, independence, core competencies 
and availability, and schemes of remuneration 
Nomination 
committee 
A specific set of criteria about roles, size, composition, and membership criteria 
such as experience, personal characteristics, independence, core competencies 
and availability 
Audit committee A specific set of criteria about roles, size, composition, and membership criteria 
such as experience, personal characteristics, independence, core competencies 
and availability 
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Table 3. Classification of codes’ recommendations on board of directors 
 
Description Definition 
Separation of 
Chairman and CEO 
• Strong: separation between Chairman and CEO, in case of CEO duality 
appointment of a lead independent director or public disclosure of the 
reasons behind the choice 
• Semi-strong: separation between Chairman’s and CEO’s roles 
• Weak: not objective and quantitative rigid rules but only general 
recommendations about the relationship between Chairman and CEO 
Board composition 
and independence  
• Strong: the majority of board members should be independent non-executive 
directors 
• Semi-strong: less than half, but at least one-third of board members should 
be independent non-executive directors 
• Weak: less than one-third of board members should be non-executive 
directors and not all of them should be independent; not objective and 
quantitative rigid rules but only general recommendations 
Evaluating board 
performance 
• Strong: self evaluation at least once a year 
• Semi-strong: self evaluation less than once a year 
• Weak: not objective and quantitative rigid rules, but only general 
recommendations 
Remuneration 
committee  
• Strong: all members should be independent non-executive directors 
• Semi-strong: all members should be non-executive directors, and the 
majority of them should be independent  
• Weak: less than the majority of its members should be independent; not 
objective and quantitative rigid rules (i.e. the board should establish a 
remuneration committee) 
Nomination 
committee 
• Strong: all members should be non-executive directors, and at least the 
majority of them should be independent  
• Semi-strong: less than the majority of its members should be independent 
non-executive directors, and separation between the chairman of the 
committee and the chairman of the board 
• Weak: not independence recommendations, not objective and quantitative 
rigid rules but only general recommendations (i.e. the board should establish 
a nomination committee) 
Audit committee • Strong: at least the majority of members and the chairman should be 
independent non-executive directors 
• Semi-strong: all members should be non-executive directors, and the 
majority of them should be independent 
• Weak: less than the majority of its members should be independent non-
executive directors, not objective and quantitative rigid rules but only 
general recommendations (i.e. the board should establish an audit 
committee) 
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Table 4. T-tests for difference-of-means on diffusion and scope of codes of good governance 
 
 Common law countries  Civil law countries 
Years of distance of first code 6.4* (.88) 8.2 (.44) 
Number of codes issued 5.86* (2.0) 2.89 (.38) 
Code’s scope 0.27* (.12) 0.55 (.09) 
Number of observations 15 29 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Standard error in parentheses. 
 
 43
Table 5. T-tests for difference-of-means on the coverage of good governance codes 
 
 Common law countries Civil law countries 
Shareholder’s rights 0.53** (.13) 0.86 (.06) 
Employee’s role 0* (0) 0.21 (.08) 
Board meeting and agenda  0.73 (.12) 0.79 (.08) 
Separation of Chairman and CEO 0.93** (.07) 0.52 (.09) 
Board composition and independence 1 (0) 1 (0) 
Board directorship 0.47† (.13) 0.24 (.08) 
Conflict of interest 0.27* (.12) 0.59 (.09) 
Deontology for director's 0 (0) 0.07 (.05) 
Election term/term limits/mandatory retirement 0.6 (.13) 0.48 (.09) 
Evaluating board performance 0.67* (.13) 0.38 (.09) 
Remuneration 1 (0) 0.90 (.06) 
Remuneration committee 0.87 (.09) 0.90 (.06) 
Nomination committee 0.87 (.09) 0.79 (.08) 
Audit committee 1 (0) 0.93 (.05) 
All items 8.93 (.34) 8.72 (.39) 
Number of observations 15 29 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Standard error in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Probit models on the strictness of recommendations of codes of good governance 
 
 Separation 
of 
chairman 
and CEO 
 
Board 
composition 
and 
independence 
Evaluating 
board 
performance 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Nomination 
committee 
Audit 
committee 
 
Overall 
strength 
 
Common law 
countries 
1.231** 
(0.418) 
0.094 
(0.401) 
0.644 
(0.400) 
0.044 
(0.366) 
0.495 
(0.395) 
1.057* 
(0.422) 
0.966** 
(0.369) 
Market 
capitalization 
% GDP 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.00 
(0.002) 
-0.00 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Log GDP -0.264*
 
(0.126) 
0.207† 
(0.124) 
0.179 
(0.129) 
0.057 
(0.109) 
-0.014 
(0.119) 
0.242† 
(0.128) 
0.085 
(0.107) 
Log likelihood -47.745 -46.221 -47.439 -53.067 -50.133 -43.593 -73.70 
LR  χ2 15.56** 2.98 4.52 1.51 7.10† 16.22*** 9.24* 
Pseudo R2 0.140 0.031 0.045 0.014 0.066 0.156 0.059 
Number of 
observations 
 
44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
† p < .10; * p< .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Standard error in parentheses. 
 
 
